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Populism and attitudes towards the EU in Slovenia

Analysis of the national survey
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Contents

Introduction

Slovenia has typically been one of the most pro-European member states. The eurozone crisis, which hit Slovenia hard, has planted the seeds of Euroscepticism. At the 2014 parliamentary elections, a radical left party United Left (*Združena levica – ZL*), which was critical towards the financial and economic policies of the EU, made it into the National Assembly. The migrant and refugee crisis also negatively affected Slovenia by exposing it to a strong influx of refugees and also boosted Euroscepticism on the centre-right. Brexit, the victory of Donald Trump in the US election and tensions between Eastern capitals and Brussels provided further ground for populism and nationalism, as represented by the non-parliamentary Slovenian National Party (*Slovenska nacionalna stranka – SNS*) and the more recently established Movement for Children and Families (*Gibanje za otroke in družine – GOD*). The centre-left government coalition that has been in power since 2014 and is led by a new progressive and liberal Modern Centre Party (*Stranka modernega centra – SMC*), with the Social Democrats (*Socialni demokrati – SD*) and the Pensioners' Party (*Demokratična stranka upokejencev – DeSUS*) as its coalition partners, tried to stick to the European path to stay in the core group of EU countries. This way, it was slightly different from the anti-reform or Euro-opportunist social liberal parties such as Positive Slovenia (*Pozitivna Slovenija – PS*), part of which later transformed into the Alliance of Alenka Bratušek (*Zavezništvo Alenke Bratušek – ZaAB*), which were more nationalist. In order to avoid criticism from the right – especially from the Slovenian Democratic Party (*Slovenska demokratska stranka – SDS*), the biggest opposition party, following a conservative and increasingly populist agenda, as well as the opposition New Slovenia (*Nova Slovenija – NSi*) and the People's Party (*Slovenska Ljudska stranka – SLS*, which failed to make it to parliament in 2014) –, it adopted a security strategy of putting up a razor-wire fence on the southern border at the height of the migrant and refugee crisis. In the end, the government was "saved" by the closure of the Balkan route. The improved macroeconomic conditions also helped in saving its image and the perception of the EU.

This paper presents a study of populism and attitudes towards the EU in Slovenia. The analysis is based on a survey conducted as a part of the project "Anti EU-rhetoric versus own national interests? Nationalistic populism and its reception in Central Europe", funded by the European Commission within the Europe for Citizens programme.

The project came in a time of growing populism and nationalism following the above-mentioned crises, feeding anti-European sentiment in Central Europe. It aims to provide an introspection of the drivers of this sort of attitudes based on a survey that goes beyond the standard Eurobarometer and national polls and that is adapted to the specifics of the region. The survey[1] was conducted in five countries of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE): Austria, Hungary, Czech Republic, Slovakia and Slovenia. The national study was the first deliverable and will be followed by a comparative analysis.

The survey was divided into three parts:
- Part one observed the general attitudes towards the EU (should Slovenia remain a member, or should it leave the EU; how objective is the presentation of the EU in political discourse in Slovenia, and what is the perception of how the country is treated by EU institutions).
- Part two observed the links between EU and national politics in different areas (the implications of EU membership and related Slovenian politics for Slovenia as a business location, for economic welfare, the political weight of Slovenia and national security; the implications of the role played by the EU and Slovenia for cooperation and mutual

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[1] Survey questions can be found in Appendix 1.

understanding/solidarity, protection of democracy and human rights, security and the refugee and asylum policy).
- Part three observed the general political attitudes (is the EU used as a scapegoat for political elites on the national level; the perception of a gap between ordinary citizens and the elites; the perception regarding the independence of the justice system, the state of democracy and human rights, independent media and the civil society, national unity, preference for a strong leader, the ability of the opposition to keep the government in check, and the society's cultural homogeneity).

In addition to this, demographic, socioeconomic and political variables were observed, such as gender, age, education, vocation, region, area of residence and political party preferences.

The online survey[2] was conducted by the CJMMK between 22 November and 14 December on a sample of 591 respondents (the survey was sent out to over 5,000 addresses).

The analysis is based on descriptive statistics, aimed at identifying key correlations and trends for further analysis.

The analysis follows the structure of the survey, and discusses the main findings and their implications for the overall aim of the project.

Survey analysis

Part I: Slovenia and the EU

Figure 1: Should Slovenia remain a member of the European Union or leave the European Union? (%)

FDV – CJMMK, Survey on attitudes towards the EU in Slovenia, N=591, 22 November–14 December 2017

The share of respondents who said that Slovenia should remain a member was 79%, while 13% said it should leave the EU.

[2] In other countries, the survey was conducted by phone.

Male respondents were more in favour of remaining (86%), whereas the pro-leave share among female respondents reached 15%. Support for remaining was highest in the age group 31–45 (84%) and lowest in the age group under 30 (21% for leaving). Moreover, it was highest among those with tertiary education (87%) and lowest among those with only primary education (18% for leaving). With respect to employment status, it was highest among farmers (100%) and the self-employed (86%) and lowest among the unemployed and stay-at-home respondents (32 and 24% for leaving respectively). Support for remaining was strongest in the statistical region of central Slovenia (87%), southeastern Slovenia and the coast&Kras region (83%), and weakest in Zasavje (37% for leaving), Gorenjska and Pomurje (18% for leaving). Residents of large cities were more in favour of remaining (87%) compared to those living in smaller ones (16% for leaving).

All respondents close to the Pensioners' Party (DeSUS) said Slovenia should remain a member of the EU, followed by those closest to the progressive and liberal SMC (99%), the People's Party (SLS – 94%), Social Democrats (92%) and the conservative Catholic NSi (90%). On the other side of the spectrum were the respondents close to the social and liberal PS (43% for leaving) and ZaAB (30% for leaving), the nationalist SNS and the unaffiliated respondents (21% for leaving).

Support for remaining in the EU was strongest among those who said that the EU was depicted in a fair way (96%) and weakest among those who said that it was either represented in a too positive or too negative way (22% and 25% for leaving respectively). Out of those who fully agreed that EU institutions treat Slovenia in a fair way, 99% said Slovenia should remain, while 44% of those who completely disagreed said it should leave. Those who disagreed or completely disagreed with the statement that the European Union is often used as a scapegoat by domestic politicians to detract from their own shortcomings also believe (97% and 100% respectively) that Slovenia should stay in the EU. Only 17% of those who completely agreed with this statement opted for leaving.

Those who found the statement that there is a gap between the views of the ordinary citizens and political elites totally exaggerated are the strongest supporters of remaining (88%), followed by those who found the description rather justified (87%) or rather exaggerated (85%). The respondents who believe there is a large gap between the elites and citizens are the strongest supporters of leaving the EU (20%). According to the next view, the strongest support for remaining was among those who find cultural homogeneity rather unimportant (84%), while the weakest support was among those who do not find it important at all (17% for leaving). Moreover, the respondents who find having a strong leader rather unimportant strongly support remaining an EU member (99%), while the respondents favouring strong leaders more inclined to leaving (19%).

To summarise, all of the categories of respondents preferred for the country to remain a member. The support for remaining correlated positively with male gender, education levels, and vocational groups. This can be linked with the opportunities provided by the EU, as well as more centrality of regions and population density. Those aligned with coalition, liberal, conservative and traditional parties are stronger supporters of remaining, while the supporters of Euro-opportunist, populist and nationalist parties are stronger supporters of leaving. The attitude towards the representation and political role of the EU in the top-down and bottom-up sense also correlated with the support for remaining/leaving. Support for remaining was strongest among those who believe in the representation system, are rather non-ethnocentric and put little value on strong authority. On the other hand, the support is weakest among those who are very critical of the representation system, are very non-ethnocentric and in favour of strong authority.

Figure 2: Do you think that the European Union is depicted in a fair way, too positive or too negative in the political discussion in our country? (%)

FDV – CJMMK, Survey on attitudes towards the EU in Slovenia, N=591, 22 November–14 December 2017

A total of 35% of all respondents said that the EU was depicted in Slovenia in a fair way, 31% said it was depicted too positively and 20% too negatively.

The view that the EU is depicted in a fair way was expressed strongest by female respondents (36%). Interestingly, male respondents dominated the too positive and too negative categories (34% and 23%). The view that the EU is represented fairly was strongest in the age group 46–60 (38%). This group, together with those aged over 60, was also the strongest in supporting the view that it is represented too positively (32%). The youngest group (under 30) was the one to believe the most that the EU is represented too negatively (29%).

The perceptions of a fair and too positive representation were strongest among those with secondary education (40% and 32% respectively), while those with only primary education were the strongest in supporting the view of a too negative representation (31%). The perception of a fair representation was strongest among the self-employed (58%), the "too positive" answer was most common among farmers (65%) and the "too negative" option among stay-at-home respondents (38%). Some regional variations were also detected: the perception of a fair representation is strongest in central Slovenia (45%), of a too positive representation in Posavje (55%) and the littoral&Notranjska region (54%), and the perception of a too negative representation in Zasavje (38%) and Pomurje (29%). The view of a fair representation is highest in bigger cities (40%), compared to the too positive and too negative ones in rural areas (31% and 21% respectively). With respect to political preferences, the perception of a fair representation was strongest among those who are close to SMC (64%), the "too positive" perception among supporters of the SNS (100%) and the far-left ZL (47%). The view of a too negative representation was most common among the respondents closest to the NSi (31%) and the SDS (29%).

The view that the EU is represented fairly was strongest among those in favour of remaining (44%); whereas the highest shares of those who chose the "too positive" and "too negative" answers would also opt for leaving the EU (54% and 38% respectively). Of those who rather agreed that the EU institutions treated Slovenia in a just way, 58% also believed it was represented in a fair way. On the other hand, 55% of those who completely disagreed said it was represented too positively. Of those who fully agreed and completely disagreed with the statement of a just treatment, 28% and 27%, respectively, said that the EU was represented too negatively. Of those who rather disagreed with the view of the EU being used as a scapegoat, 70% said it was represented in a fair way, while 48% of those who completely disagreed with this statement believed it was represented in a too positive way, and 23% of those who completely agreed that the EU was used as a scapegoat also believe that it is represented too negatively.

Of those who see the view of a gap between ordinary citizens and elites as rather exaggerated, 58% said the EU was represented in a fair way. The respondents who believe speaking of the gap is completely justified also felt that EU was represented in a too positive way (44%). On the other hand, 30% of those who view the gap as completely exaggerated found that the EU was represented too negatively. Of those who find a culturally homogenous society rather important, 38% said the EU was represented in a fair way. 34% of the respondents for whom homogeneity is rather unimportant said the EU was represented too positively, while 31% of those who find it completely unimportant said it was represented too negatively. Of those who see a strong leader as rather important, 41% said the EU was represented in a fair way.

To summarise, the perception of the representation is polarised among male respondents, and varies especially across vocational groups and regions, where those better linked (and thus better informed) and integrated share the view of a fair representation. The voters of the populist right and far-left parties more often view the perception of the EU as too positive. The supporters of conservative parties more often view it as too negative. The perception of a fair representation is strongly related to a very positive attitude towards EU membership and a rather positive attitude towards the top-down and bottom-up role of the EU. The perception of a fair representation was linked with a rather supportive view of the representation system, rather ethnocentric and pro-strong authority oriented views. Those with anti-ethnocentric and anti-strong authority views more often believed the EU was represented too negatively.

Figure 3: Do you think that Slovenia overall is treated in a fair way by the institutions of the European Union? (%)

FDV – CJMMK, Survey on attitudes towards the EU in Slovenia, N=591, 22 November–14 December 2017

The views of the respondents on whether Slovenia is treated fairly by EU institutions are divided as follows: 7% completely agreed, 39% rather agreed, 40% rather disagreed and 8% completely disagreed.

While the view of a fair treatment (completely agree and rather agree) was strongest among male respondents (49%), it was weakest (completely disagree and rather disagree) among female respondents (49%). The affirmative view is strongest among those under 30 (53%), while those over 60 are the age group that disagrees the most (52%). In similar terms, 51% of those with tertiary education agreed and 61% of those with primary education disagreed. Moreover, the affirmative view was strongest among students (63%) and the self-employed (55%), and weakest amongst stay-at-home respondents (70% disagreed) and farmers (65% disagreed). In regional terms, the view of a fair treatment prevailed in the littoral&Notranjska region (55%), central and southeastern Slovenia (both 53%), while the opposite applied to Pomurje (64%) and Posavje (63%). While 51% of the

respondents from bigger cities agreed with the view of a fair treatment, 52% of those living in rural areas disagree.

The affirmative side with regard to fair treatment was strongest among voters who found themselves closest to the NSi and the SMC (65% and 61% respectively). On the other hand, it is weakest among those who declared themselves as closest to other parties, the ZaAB and the SNS (66%, 61%, and 59% disagreed respectively).

A positive correlation can be observed also among the belief in fair treatment and the preference to remain a member of the EU (56%). On the other side, those who said Slovenia should leave feel the treatment is not fair (94%). Agreement on fair treatment is strongest among those who also believe the EU is represented fairly (73%), and the opposing view was strongest among those who perceive the representation of the EU as too positive (74%) or too negative (53%). Those who rather disagree with the view that the EU is used as a scapegoat agree the most with the view of fair treatment by EU institutions (70%), while those who completely agree that it is used as a scapegoat nevertheless disagree the most that the treatment is fair (61%).

Agreement on fair treatment is strongest among those who see the description of a gap between ordinary citizens and the elites as rather exaggerated (74%), and weakest among those who see it as completely justified (62% disagreed). It is also strongest among those who find cultural homogeneity very important (49% agreed) and weakest among those who think it is rather unimportant (51% disagreed). Finally, it is strongest among those who find a strong leader not important at all or rather important (53% agreed), and weakest among those who see having a strong leader as very important (54% disagreed).

To sum up, the view of being treated fairly by the EU institutions is stronger among younger and better educated respondents and those expecting to benefit more from the EU in terms of vocation and place of residence (more developed and better integrated regions and urban areas). The view of fair treatment is also strongest among supporters of liberal conservative parties and weakest among those of populist social liberal and nationalist parties. The view correlates positively with the view on membership, on the representation of the EU and a rather positive attitude towards EU politics in the bottom-up sense. Agreement further correlates positively with a rather positive attitude towards the representation system, strong ethnocentrism and an anti-strong authority orientation (and negatively with a very critical attitude towards the representation system, strong anti-ethnocentrism and pro-strong authority views).

Part II: EU and national politics

Figure 4: Do you think that EU membership currently brings more advantages or more disadavantages for... (%)

FDV – CJMMK, Survey on attitudes towards the EU in Slovenia, N=591, 22 November–14 December 2017

As we can see from the figure above, a large majority of respondents recognises the positive effects of membership for business and economy, politics and security. Combining the positive categories of definitely more advantages and rather more advantages, 79% of the respondents see advantages for Slovenia as a business location, 68% see advantages for economic welfare, 57% for political weight and 71% for security.

The respondents said that EU membership brought rather more advantages for Slovenia as a business location (an average grade of 1.79[3]), for Slovenia's security (1.94), economic welfare (2.07) and political weight (2.29).

Male respondents gave higher grades in all categories (business location 1.71 vs 1.86 with women, economic welfare 1.99 vs 2.16 with women, political weight 2.26 vs 2.31 with women, security 1.93 vs 1.97 with women). Those aged 31–45 see the strongest advantages for business (1.59), economic welfare (1.89) and political weight (2.21), and those over 60 for security (1.76). Those aged 46–60 see the least advantages for Slovenia as a business location (1.91), for its economic welfare (2.2) and political weight (2.38), and those under 30 for security (2.12). The respondents with tertiary education gave the highest grades for business (1.61) and economic welfare (1.8), and those with only primary school for political weight (2.04) and security (1.76). Those with vocational education gave the lowest grades for business (1.91), economic welfare (2.26) and political weight (2.38). The lowest grade for security came from respondents with secondary education (2.05). The self-employed gave the highest grade for Slovenia as a business location (1.61) and farmers for economic welfare (1.65), political weight (1.65) and security (1). Stay-at-home respondents gave the lowest grades for business location (1.90), economic welfare (2.43) and security (2.62). The lowest grade for political weight came from the unemployed (2.82).

The Gorenjska region gave the highest grade for business (1.61) and security (1.72), Zasavje for economic welfare (1.79) and Koroška for political weight (1.92). The respondents from the Posavje

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[3] On a scale of 1–4, where 1 is "definitely more advantages" and 4 is "definitely more disadvantages".

region gave the lowest score for business (2.04) and security (2.18), those from Pomurje for economic welfare (2.45) and security (2.18), and those from Zasavje for political weight (2.57). Those living in a larger cities gave the highest and those in smaller ones the lowest grades in all categories (business location 1.63 vs 1.88, economic welfare 1.98 vs 2.16, political power 2.20 vs 2.35, security 1.87 vs 1.97).

Potential voters of the SMC see the most advantages of EU membership for Slovenia as a business location (1.35), for its political weight (1.80) and security (1.61). The same grade for security was given by those who find themselves closest to the NSi. The highest grade for economic welfare came from the ultra-conservative Catholic GOD (1), followed by the SMC (1.49). The lowest grade for business location was given by voters close to the GOD (2.5), for political weight by those opting for the PS (2.81) and DeSUS (2.8), and for security by those whose choice in the survey was "other party" (2.48), followed by the ZaAB (2.33).

The supporters of Slovenia's EU membership also valued the advantages of membership higher than those who said it should leave (business location 1.56 vs 2.89, economic welfare 1.83 vs 3.23, political power 2.07 vs 3.45, and security 1.73 vs 2.97). Those who said the EU was represented in a fair way gave the highest and those who said it was represented too positively gave the lowest average grades in all categories (business location 1.56 vs 2.01, economic welfare 1.67 vs 2.48, political power 1.86 vs 2.72, and security 1.57 vs 2.25). The respondents who feel that Slovenia is being treated fairly by EU institutions definitely see more advantages for Slovenia as a business location (1.28), for economic welfare (1.46) and security (1.44), but only rather more advantages for political weight (1.52). On the other hand, those who definitely disagreed on fair treatment rather agreed on a positive impact for the country as a business location (2.37) and rather disagreed on a positive impact for economic welfare (2.97), political weight (3.36) and security (2.76). Those who completely disagreed with the view of the EU being used as a scapegoat saw the most advantages and those rather agreeing with it the least advantages (business location 1 vs 1.83, economic welfare 1 vs 2.19, political weight 1 vs 2.41, security 1.68 vs 2.01) (the average grades by those who did not know the answer were even lower: business 2.68, economic welfare 2.75, political weight 2.89, security 2.38).

The respondents who see the view of a wide gap between ordinary citizens and the elites as rather justified gave the highest grades to the EU's contribution for a business location (1.63), those seeing the gap as rather exaggerated to the EU's role for economic welfare (1.75) and security (1.62), and those who see it as completely exaggerated for political weight (1.73). The respondents who find the view of a wide gap as completely justified were rather sceptical of the advantages of membership (business location 1.89, economic welfare 2.26, political weight 2.55 and security 2.11). If cultural homogeneity was assessed as rather unimportant, the advantages were evaluated as the highest on average (business location 1.68, economic welfare 1.87, political power 2.18, and security 1.82). Those who see it as rather important gave the lowest grades for business location (1.83), while those who do not find it important at all gave the lowest grades for economic welfare (2.13), political power (2.43) and security (2.19) (those who did not know the answer gave even lower grades: business location 2.19, economic welfare 2.35, security 2.62). The respondents to whom a strong leader is rather unimportant gave the overall highest grades (business location 1.26, economic welfare 1.75, political power 1.93, and security 1.71). The respondents in favour of a very strong leader gave the lowest grades for business location (1.87) and economic welfare (2.16), while those to whom it is not important at all to have a strong leader gave the lowest scores for political weight (2.47) and security (2.36) (the lowest grades were given by those who did not know the answer: business location 2.61, economic welfare 2.90, political weight 2.86, security 2.39).

To summarise, the implications of EU membership are seen as rather positive in all of the four categories. They are viewed more positively by male respondents, particularly with regard to business and economy. There is an intergenerational split between those aged 31–45 and those aged 46–60, which could indicate different positions of the pre-EU and EU membership age groups. The impact on security is viewed most positively by the oldest and most negatively by the youngest respondents, which can again be explained by the different experience of the generations. In terms

of vocational groups, an impact assessment gives a correlation with the relative (dis)advantages brought by EU membership in different areas. The situation is the same with regard to regions and areas of residence. The respondents close to progressive and the liberal conservative parties grade the impact the highest in all categories, while the lowest grades as to the advantages of EU membership were given by those close to anti-reform and populist parties.

The assessments positively correlate with the attitude towards EU membership, EU politics in the top-down and bottom-up sense (still, those who rather agree on the EU being used as a scapegoat gave the most negative grades). Rather positive and rather negative attitudes towards the representation system correlated positively with the attitudes towards the advantages of EU membership. The one difference is political weight, where the highest grades came from the respondents who also found the argument of a wide gap between ordinary citizens and the elites completely exaggerated. Rather non-ethnocentric and anti-strong authority views correlated with the highest grades. The most negative grades were given by those with strong non-ethnocentric positions, strong anti-authority positions (for economic welfare and business) and strong pro-authority positions (for political weight and security), indicating the role of the far-left and far-right. Finally, those who did not know the answers to these questions selected the most negative grades.

Figure 5: **Do you think that the politics of Slovenia regarding European matters currently brings more advantages or more disadavantages for... (%)**

FDV – CJMMK, Survey on attitudes towards the EU in Slovenia, N=591, 22 November–14 December 2017

According to the respondents, the politics of Slovenia regarding European matters brings rather more advantages for security (2.17[4]), business (2.36) and economic welfare (2.44), but rather more disadvantages for political weight (2.60).

Again, a gender difference can be observed, since the male respondents assess the advantages more positively in all the categories except for political weight (business location 2.29 vs 2.42, economic welfare 2.33 vs 2.55, political weight 2.60 vs 2.59, and security 2.16 vs 2.18). A generational difference can also be observed in this question – the respondents over 61 gave the highest grades and those under 30 the lowest grades in all categories. The latter believed that politics in Slovenia brings rather more disadvantages (business location 2.13 vs 2.80, economic welfare 2.21 vs 2.87, political weight 2.51 vs 2.76, security 1.96 vs 2.50). Moreover, the younger generation (under 30) see

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[4] On a scale of 1–4, where 1 is "definitely more advantages" and 4 is "definitely more disadvantages".

more advantages for political weight than for business and economy, while those aged 31–45 ranked the advantages for business location (2.26) slightly higher than for security (2.27). Differences can be observed with regard to educational attainment. Those with only primary education gave the highest grades in all categories (business location 2.15, economic welfare 2.20, political weight 2.16, security 1.82). They placed political weight before economic welfare. On the other hand, those with secondary education gave the lowest grades in all categories (business location 2.45, economic welfare 2.53, political weight 2.72, security 2.33). Some differences can also be seen with regard to respondents' activity status. The retired respondents rather agreed on more advantages in all areas, giving the highest grades (business location 2.18, economic welfare 2.21, political weight 2.46, security 1.92), while stay-at-home respondents rather disagreed, giving the lowest scores (business location 2.98, economic welfare 2.92, political weight 3.14, security 2.66). For students, the advantages for political power (2.65) came before those for business location (2.79) and economic welfare (2.83).

The highest grades for the impact of domestic politics for Slovenia as a business location were given in the Gorenjska region (2.12), for economic welfare in Savinjska (2.28), for political weight in Podravje (2.49) and for security in Koroška (1.91). The lowest grades for business location were given in Pomurje (2.58), for economic welfare in the littoral&Notranjska (2.7), for political weight in Posavje (3.03) and for security in Posavje and Pomurje (both 2.37). Some differences can be observed in the grading of different categories of advantages in different regions, yet it is very difficult to identify the reasons for such differences.[5] On the other hand, we can assume that the difference in assessments by those living in bigger cities (the highest grades) than those living in small towns (the lowest grades) in all categories (business location 2.23 vs 2.43, economic welfare 2.34 vs 2.50, political weight 2.49 vs 2.64, security 2.05 vs 2.22 – the last two grades were equal to the ones given by those living in rural areas) can be the result of a more direct impact of EU membership.

With regard to political orientation, the highest grades for business location were given by those who see themselves as closest to the SNS (1.85), for economic welfare and political power by those closest to the SMC (1.99 and 2.12 respectively), and for security by those closest to the SD (1.82) (those who did not know the answer gave an average grade of 1.78). The impact on the country as a business location is assessed as low by the voters who find themselves closest to the GOD and the ZaAB (2.5) (the undecided and unaffiliated gave an average of 2.54 and 2.52 respectively), just as the impact on economic welfare by those closest to the SNS (3.07). From those close to the NSi, PS, SDS, SMC and ZL, economic welfare received higher grades than business location (2.2 vs 2.34, 2.03 vs 2.09, 2.37 vs 2.46, 1.99 vs 2.06, 2.48 vs 2.49). SLS voters assessed political weight (2.26) higher than economic welfare (2.35) and business (2.40). From the respondents who are close to the SNS, business location (1.85) received a higher grade than security (2.09), politics (2.71) and economic welfare (3.07). ZaAB supporters rate the impact on business location (2.50) less negatively than that on security (2.58), economic welfare (2.88) and political power (2.92). For those close to other parties, the impact on business (2.48) was slightly more positive than that on security (2.52).

If we try to correlate different answers to other questions with the one on the impact, we see that supporters of membership are convinced of a positive impact, while those who claim Slovenia should leave gave the most negative grades, believing that Slovenian politics bring rather more disadvantages (business location 2.20 vs 3.10, economic welfare 2.27 vs 3.34, political weight 2.45 vs 3.48, security 2.00 vs 3.08). The respondents who said the EU was represented in a fair way gave the highest grades (business location 2.07, economic welfare 2.07, political weight 2.22, security 1.87). On the other hand, those who believe the EU is represented too negatively gave the lowest grades for the impact on business (2.59) and security (2.42). The respondents who completely agree that Slovenia is treated in a fair way by EU institutions assessed the impact the highest for business and

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[5] Those in Pomurje graded economic welfare higher than business (2.57 vs 2.58), in Podravje political weight was graded higher than economic welfare (2.49 vs 2.51) and in Koroška, Savinjska, Zasavje, Posavje and southeastern Slovenia economic welfare received higher grades than business (2.32 vs 2.4, 2.28 vs 2.34, 2.29 vs 2.41, 2.51 vs 2.53, 2.47 vs 2.49, respectively).

economic welfare (2.11 and 2.12 respectively), while those who rather agree gave the highest grades for the impact on political weight and security (2.24 and 1.88). We see that the negative feelings about the EU persist: The respondents who feel very strongly that Slovenia is not treated fairly also gave the lowest grades in all categories of impact (business location 2.89, economic welfare 3.18, political weight 3.46, security 2.92), and graded the impact on business location higher than security. Similarly, those completely disagreeing with the view of the EU being used as a scapegoat awarded the highest grades for impact, while those completely agreeing with this statement gave the lowest grades in all categories (business location 1.48 vs 2.46, economic welfare 1.48 vs 2.60, political weight 1.95 vs 2.71, security 1.21 vs 2.25).

Those who think speaking of a wide gap between ordinary citizens and the elites is rather justified gave the highest grades in all categories (business location 2.21, economic welfare 2.18, political weight 2.33, security 1.93). The respondents who completely agree that there is a wide gap gave the lowest grades for the impact on economic welfare (2.64) and security (2.32), while those who see this statement as completely exaggerated gave the lowest grades for the impact on business location (2.48) and political weight (2.82) (the lowest grades were given by those who did not know the answer: business location 2.71, economic welfare 2.72, political weight 2.94, security 2.55). The respondents who see cultural homogeneity as very important gave the highest and those who see it as completely unimportant gave the lowest grades (business location 2.22 vs 2.67, economic welfare 2.33 vs 2.56, political weight 2.48 vs 2.97, security 2.08 vs 2.66) (those who did not know the answer gave even lower grades for business location and economic welfare: 2.74 and 2.77 respectively). For the respondents who see cultural homogeneity as completely unimportant, the impact on economic welfare (2.56) was greater than on security (2.66). Those who see having a strong leader as rather unimportant gave the highest grades for impact on business location (2.3), political weight (2.49) and security (1.99), and those who see it as rather important gave the highest grades for economic welfare (2.32). If a strong leader is seen as completely unimportant, the impact in all categories was seen as negative (business location 2.56, economic welfare 2.98, political weight 3.31, security 2.78) (the lowest grades were given by those who did not know the answer: business location 2.78, economic welfare 3.06, political weight 3.19, security 2.82). For those who see it as completely unimportant, the impact on business (2.56) was less negative than that on security (2.78).

To sum up, female respondents are more critical towards the politics of Slovenia, especially with regard to their impact on business and economy. The grades correlate positively with age, as younger respondents see rather more disadvantages in all areas, particularly in business and economy, indicating a possible intergenerational conflict. The respondents with primary education gave the highest and those with secondary education the lowest grades, which could potentially be explained with a diverging economic position of manual and semi-skilled workers. An interesting observation can be made for the two categories that are less active on the labour market, as they gave the opposite grades: pensioners gave the highest grades, while stay-at-home respondents gave the lowest. Those who live in the more developed northwestern regions and larger cities gave higher, and those in less developed southeastern regions and smaller towns gave lower grades. The highest grades were given by the respondents who find themselves closest to the progressive liberal coalition parties, while the lowest grades were given by the potential voters of different sorts of anti-reform liberal social, nationalist and ultra-conservative parties.

The grades correlate positively with the attitude towards remaining a member, fair representation (those saying it is represented too positively gave the lowest grades for impact of Slovenian politics on political weight and economic welfare) and attitudes towards EU politics in a top-down and bottom-up sense (in the bottom-up sense, negative grades were linked to a relatively more negative view of security). Those with rather critical views of the representation system gave the highest and those with very critical/very supportive views the lowest grades for economic welfare and security/political weight and business location indicating a left–right split. The grades correlated positively with ethnocentrism. The highest grades were given by the respondents with a rather anti-strong authority position and the lowest by those with strong anti-authority views, indicating a split between the radical left and progressive liberals.

Figure 6: Do you think the European Union is playing a positive or a negative role in the following areas... (%)

FDV – CJMMK, Survey on attitudes towards the EU in Slovenia, N=591, 22 November–14 December 2017

The respondents believe that the EU plays a rather positive role concerning the security of Slovenia (an average of 2.03[6]), mutual understanding and cooperation between EU member states (2.16), and protection of democracy and fundamental rights (2.16), but a rather negative role concerning the policy of asylum and refugees (2.81).

Male respondents gave more positive grades than women in all categories but asylum policy (cooperation: 2.09 vs 2.23; democracy 2.13 vs 2.19; security 2.01 vs 2.07; asylum 2.81 vs 2.80). The female respondents graded the EU's role for democracy higher than for cooperation. Those under 30 graded its role for cooperation the highest (1.94), while those over 60 gave the highest grades for democracy (2.1) and security (1.94), and those aged 46–60 for asylum policy (2.77). The latter age group gave the lowest grades for cooperation (2.26) and democracy (2.22), while the lowest grades for security came from the group under 30 (2.14) and for asylum from those aged 31–45 and over 61 (both 2.85). The younger respondents (under 30) placed the EU's role for cooperation first (1.94), while the 46–60 age group and those over 61 see its role for democracy as more positive than that for cooperation (2.22 vs 2.26 and 2.10 vs 2.17 respectively).

The respondents with only primary education gave the highest grades in all categories (cooperation 2.05, democracy 2.02, security 1.75, asylum 2.64). The lowest grades for cooperation were given by those with vocational education (2.26), and for other categories by those with secondary education (democracy 2.21, security 2.15, asylum 2.86).

The highest grades for the role for cooperation and democracy came from students (1.63 and 1.88 respectively), for security by pensioners (1.93) and for asylum policy by farmers (2.35). The lowest grades for cooperation, security and asylum policy were given by stay-at-home respondents (2.48, 2.56 and 3.01 respectively), whereas for democracy it was the unemployed who gave the lowest grade (2.46). The respondents working in the private sector or as civil servants graded the bloc's role for cooperation more positively than for democracy (2.22 vs 2.24 and 2.10 vs 2.11 respectively). The self-employed ranked cooperation (2.08) and democracy (2.13) before security (2.14). Stay-at-home respondents ranked democracy (2.35) before cooperation (2.48) and security (2.56). Pensioners ranked democracy (2.10) before cooperation (2.20), while students ranked cooperation (1.63) before

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[6] On a scale of 1–4, where 1 means "a very positive role" and 4 means "a very negative role".

democracy (1.88) and security (2.05). The unemployed graded cooperation (2.24) more positively than democracy (2.46).

The highest average grade for cooperation was given in the Podravje region (2.00), and for democracy, security and asylum policy in Gorenjska (1.99, 1.87 and 2.60 – the same as in Goriška). The lowest grade for cooperation was given in Zasavje (2.44), for democracy and asylum policy in southeast Slovenia (2.49 and 3.25), and for security in Posavje (2.26).[7]

The respondents living in bigger cities gave the highest grades in all categories (cooperation 2.08, democracy 2.09, security 1.96, asylum 2.69), while the residents of smaller towns gave the lowest grades for cooperation (2.22) and security (2.09). The respondents from rural areas gave an average grade of 2.21 for democracy and 2.90 for asylum policy. Those from rural areas and bigger cities gave a higher grade for cooperation than democracy (2.17 vs 2.21 and 2.08 vs 2.09 respectively) while residents of smaller towns did the opposite (2.16 vs 2.22).

The voters closest to the SLS gave the highest grade for cooperation (1.87) and asylum policy (2.49), those favouring the SMC for democracy (1.83), and those closest to the SD for security (1.78) (the unaffiliated gave even higher grades for security and asylum – 1.74 and 2.39 respectively). ZaAB supporters provided the lowest grade for cooperation (2.58), those affiliated with the GOD for democracy (3.00) and security (2.50), and those close to DeSUS for asylum policy (3.16).[8]

The respondents who said Slovenia should remain a member graded the EU's role more positively in all categories than those who said it should leave the bloc (cooperation 2.01 vs 2.88, democracy 2.03 vs 2.99, security 1.87 vs 2.89, asylum 2.72 vs 3.49; those who did not know gave the least negative grade for asylum policy – 2.65). Leave votes correlate with ranking cooperation before security and democracy. Those who said the EU was represented in a fair way gave the highest and those who said it was represented too positively the lowest grades in all categories (cooperation 1.88 vs 2.45, democracy 1.88 vs 2.53, security 1.73 vs 2.26, asylum 2.50 vs 3.16).[9] Those who completely agree that EU institutions are treating Slovenia in a fair way gave the highest grades and those who completely disagree with this gave the lowest ones in all categories (cooperation 1.61 vs 2.75, democracy 1.70 vs 2.79, security 1.62 vs 2.77, asylum 2.22 vs 3.16). Both the respondents who completely agree and those who completely disagree ranked the EU's role for cooperation before that for security and democracy. An interesting correlation can be seen with regard to those who disagreed that the EU was being used as a scapegoat – this group gave the highest grades for cooperation (1.95), security (1.90) and asylum policy (2.50). The respondents who totally agreed with the scapegoat thesis gave the lowest grades to the bloc's role for cooperation, democracy and security (2.21, 2.26 and 2.07 respectively; those who did not know gave an even lower grade for

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[7] The respondents in Pomurje, Koroška, southeast Slovenia, Goriška and the coast&Kras gave the role for cooperation a more positive grade than for democracy (2.22 vs 2.36, 2.20 vs 2.44, 2.36 vs 2.49, 2.03 vs 2.18 and 2.16 vs 2.24 respectively). In Zasavje, Posavje, the littoral&Notranjska, central Slovenia and Gorenjska, the order was reversed and the role for democracy was graded more positively than for cooperation (2.18 vs 2.44, 2.30 vs 2.41, 2.05 vs 2.16, 2.10 vs 2.17 and 1.99 vs 2.08 respectively). In Podravje, cooperation received the most positive grade (2.00), followed by security (2.08) and democracy (2.14).

[8] DeSUS supporters ranked cooperation first (2.27), followed by security (2.54) and democracy (2.61). GOD supporters ranked the three categories in the same order (2.00, 2.50 and 3.00 respectively). NSi, PS, ZaAB and ZL supporters ranked cooperation before democracy (2.00 vs 2.01, 2.19 vs 2.42, 2.58 vs 2.63, 2.16 vs 2.34). SD, SDS, SMC, SNS supporters and the unaffiliated ranked democracy before cooperation (2.03 vs 2.08, 2.05 vs 2.01, 1.83 vs 1.97, 2.14 vs 2.21, 2.21 vs 2.24). Supporters of other parties placed cooperation before democracy and security (2.12, 2.17 and 2.29 respectively).

[9] Those who think the EU is represented too positively also rank cooperation (2.45) before democracy (2.53), while those who see the representation as too negative ranked democracy before security and cooperation (2.09, 2.19 and 2.26 respectively).

security – 2.11) while the lowest grade for asylum policy was given by those who completely disagree with the thesis (3.27).[10]

The respondents who saw the view of a wide gap between ordinary citizens and the elites as rather exaggerated gave the highest grade for cooperation (2.00) and asylum policy (2.58), while those who saw it as rather justified gave the highest grade for democracy (1.97) and security (1.84). Regarding the view as completely justified correlates with the lowest grades for cooperation, democracy and asylum policy (2.29, 2.35 and 2.99 respectively), while the lowest grade for security correlates with responses that the gap is completely exaggerated (2.31).[11]

The respondents who do not find cultural homogeneity important at all gave a high grade for cooperation (2.11). On the other hand, the respondents who find it very important also grade more positively the EU's contribution for democracy, security and asylum policy (2.09 1.96 and 2.70 respectively; for democracy the highest grade, 1.68, came from those who did not know). The lowest grade for cooperation was given by those who found homogeneity rather important (2.19), for democracy and security from those who do not find it important at all (2.36, 2.08), and for asylum policy from those who find it rather unimportant (2.89). (Those who did not know how to answer gave the lowest grades for cooperation, security and asylum policy – 2.41, 3.21 and 3.61respectively.)[12] An interesting difference can be observed with respect to the importance respondents place on a strong leader. While the respondents who feel that having a strong leader is rather unimportant gave the highest grades, whereas the group who said a strong leader was not important at all gave the lowest grades in all categories (cooperation 1.94 vs 2.36, democracy 1.99 vs 2.42, security 1.80 vs 2.21, asylum 2.67 vs 2.81).

To summarise, male respondents generally gave higher grades. Young respondents gave relatively low and old respondents relatively high grades for security, which could be explained with the latter having a broader historical perspective. Those with primary education gave the highest and those with secondary education the lowest grades. Higher education levels correlate positively with relatively stronger appreciation of a positive role for cooperation as opposed to democracy, which could be explained with greater awareness and benefits related to international cooperation. Some of the marginalised vocational categories, such as stay-at-home or unemployed respondents, gave lower grades in general. More developed and better integrated regions gave higher grades. The lowest grades on security in asylum policy were given in eastern and southeastern regions, which were affected directly by the migrant and refugee crisis. Those closer to traditional parties and the ruling coalition gave higher and those closer to populist social liberal, ultra-conservative and niche parties gave lower grades.

There is a positive correlation between the preference of remaining a member, the view of the EU being represented fairly and attitudes towards EU politics in the top-down and bottom-up sense (with respect to the latter, the highest grades were given by those who rather disagreed, while the lowest for asylum policy were given by those who disagreed completely, who also ranked security relatively low). The respondents with moderate views towards representation gave the highest grades, and those with very critical views the lowest grades (except for security, where the lowest grade was given by those with a very supportive attitude). Ethnocentric attitudes correspond with the highest grades, while rather non-ethnocentric attitudes with the lowest grades, indicating a right–left divide. The respondents who are rather against strong authority awarded the highest

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[10] Those who totally agreed placed cooperation before democracy, while those who rather agreed or rather disagreed placed democracy before cooperation (2.09 vs 2.13, 1.89 vs 1.95). Those who disagreed completely ranked democracy (1.79) before cooperation and security (both 2.00).

[11] Those who see this view as completely justified ranked cooperation before democracy (2.29 vs 2.35), those who see it as rather justified and rather exaggerated ranked democracy before cooperation (2.02 vs 1.97, 2.00 vs 1.99), while those who see it as completely exaggerated ranked cooperation before democracy and security (2.15, 2.19 and 2.31 respectively).

[12] Those who found cultural homogeneity very or rather important ranked democracy before cooperation (2.09 vs 2.12, 2.16 vs 2.19), while the respondents who found it rather or very unimportant placed cooperation before democracy (2.15 vs 2.27, 2.11 vs 2.36).

grades, while strongly anti-authority oriented ones gave the lowest grades, indicating a liberal progressive vs radical left split.

Figure 7: Do you think Slovenia is playing a positive or a negative role in the European Union in the following areas... (%)

FDV – CJMMK, Survey on attitudes towards the EU in Slovenia, N=591, 22 November–14 December 2017

According to the respondents, the Slovenian government contributes rather positively to solidarity with other EU member states (2.17[13]), the security of Slovenia (2.25) and the protection of democracy and human rights (2.41), but rather negatively to the policy of asylum and refugees (2.68).

Male respondents gave higher grades than women in all categories but solidarity (solidarity 2.19 vs 2.14, democracy 2.40 vs 2.42, security 2.25 vs 2.27, asylum 2.66 vs 2.70). The age group of those over 610 gave the highest grades for solidarity and democracy (2.09 and 2.31 respectively), with the age group 46–60 giving highest grade for security and asylum policy (2.19 and 2.58 respectively). Those under 30 gave the lowest grades for solidarity (2.21), democracy (2.58) and security (2.32), while the lowest grade for asylum policy came from those aged 31–45 (2.76).

The respondents with tertiary education were the ones to find the state's impact on solidarity the most positive (2.10), while those with primary and vocational education valued its role for democracy the most (2.34). Those with primary education the government's role for security important (2.11) and those with primary and secondary education gave the least negative grade for its role regarding asylum policy (2.61). The respondents with primary education gave the lowest grades for solidarity (2.25), those with secondary for democracy (2.47) and security (2.32), and those with tertiary for asylum policy (2.73). Those with primary and vocational education gave better grades for security than solidarity (2.11 vs 2.25, 2.15 vs 2.19). Public sector employees gave the government the highest grades for solidarity (2.09), pensioners for democracy (2.29) and farmers for security and asylum policy (2.04, 2.00). However, farmers –together with the self-employed – gave the lowest grades for solidary (2.35). The self-employed also gave the lowest grades for democracy (2.76), while stay-at home respondents gave the lowest ones for security (2.66) and asylum policy (2.76). Farmers ranked asylum policy before security and solidarity (2.00, 2.04 and 2.35 respectively). Students graded the role regarding asylum policy (2.30) more positively than for democracy (2.35).

The Gorenjska region gave the highest grades for solidarity (1.95) and security (2.05), Savinjska for democracy (2.17) and Podravje for asylum policy (2.48). Zasavje gave the lowest grades for solidarity

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[13] On a scale of 1–4, where 1 means "a very positive role" and 4 means "a very negative role".

(2.54), Koroška for democracy (2.88) and security (2.53), and southeastern Slovenia for asylum policy (3.20).[14]

The living environment also affected the grades. City dwellers gave the highest grades in all categories (solidarity 1.98, democracy 2.35, security 2.19, asylum 2.62), while those from small towns gave the lowest score for solidarity and security (2.32 and 2.28 respectively), and those from rural areas for democracy, security and asylum (2.48, 2.28 and 2.75 respectively). Those living in small towns graded security more positively than solidarity (2.28 and 2.32 respectively).

The supporters of the SNS gave the highest grades for solidarity (1.64), those who find the GOD as their closest option gave the best grades for democracy (2.00), and SMC supporters for security (1.92, same as the undecided) and asylum policy (2.30; the undecided 2.29). Those close to the SDS gave the lowest grades for solidarity (2.37) and democracy (2.70; those who said other party gave the lowest grade – 2.95), supporters of the PS for security (3.01), and ZL supporters for asylum policy (2.94). Supporters of the GOD gave the same average grades for solidarity and democracy (2.00) and for security and asylum policy (2.50). Supporters of the NSi graded democracy better than security (2.23 vs 2.25), supporters of the PS put democracy before asylum and security (2.36, 2.67 and 3.01 respectively). Supporters of the SD and SLS, as well as the unaffiliated, graded the government's role for security before solidarity (1.95 vs 2.03, 1.96 vs 2.05, 2.30 vs 2.31).

The supporters of Slovenia's EU membership awarded the government with the highest grades, as on the opposite side the "leave" option gave the lowest grades in all categories (solidarity 2.07 vs 2.64, democracy 2.31 vs 3.01, security 2.14 vs 2.93, asylum 2.59 vs 3.28). Those who think the EU is represented fairly gave the highest and those saying it is represented in a too negative way the lowest grades in all categories except for democracy, where the lowest grade was given by those who think it is represented too positively (solidarity 2.03 vs 2.38, democracy 2.15 vs 2.66, security 1.99 vs 2.56, asylum 2.43 vs 2.89). The respondents who believe that the EU is represented properly ranked security higher than solidarity (1.99 vs 2.03). Those who definitely agree that EU institutions are treating Slovenia in a fair way gave the highest grades for solidarity, democracy and asylum (2.01, 2.21 and 2.15 respectively), and those rather agreeing with the same statement to democracy and security (2.21 and 2.06 respectively). The respondents who definitely disagree with this statement gave the lowest grades in all categories (solidarity 2.47, democracy 2.87, security 2.80, asylum 3.03). Those who completely disagree that the EU is being used as a scapegoat gave the national government the highest, and those who completely agree the lowest grades in all categories (solidarity 1.95 vs 2.19, democracy 1.79 vs 2.60, security 1.40 vs 2.35, asylum 2.27 vs 2.82).[15]

The respondents who rather believe there is a wide gap between the elites and ordinary people gave the highest grades for solidarity and security (2.10 and 2.10 respectively), and those who said this belief was rather exaggerated gave the best grades for democracy and asylum (2.17 and 2.37 respectively). Those who say it is completely exaggerated gave the lowest grades for solidarity and democracy (2.52 and 2.73 respectively), whole those who find the view completely justified to security and asylum (2.36 and 2.86 respectively; the overall lowest grades were given by those who did not know the answer: solidarity 2.63, democracy 2.86, security 2.62, asylum 3.19). The respondents who find it completely exaggerated graded solidarity highest, followed by democracy, security and asylum policy (2.21, 2.50, 2.52 and 2.73 respectively). The respondents who consider cultural homogeneity very important gave the highest and those saying it is not important at all the lowest grades in all categories (solidarity 2.11 vs 2.47, democracy 2.33 vs 2.75, security 2.16 vs 2.70, asylum 2.51 vs 3.02). Those who put great importance on a strong leader gave the highest grades for

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[14] The respondents in Pomurje, Posavje and the littoral&Notranjska ranked the government's role for security before solidarity (2.35 vs 2.39, 2.43 vs 2.48, 2.16 vs 2.17). Those from Zasavje ranked security before democracy and solidarity (2.37, 2.40 and 2.54 respectively) and those from southeastern Slovenia democracy before security (2.45 vs 2.50).

[15] Those who rather agree graded security higher than solidarity (2.15 vs 2.16), with those who rather disagree ranking democracy before security and solidarity (2.05, 2.09 and 2.11 respectively), and those who completely disagree security before democracy and solidarity (1.95, 1.79 and 1.40 respectively).

solidarity (2.12) and security (2.18), and those who find this rather important gave the best grades for democracy (2.35) and asylum policy (2.60). Those who believe strong leadership is completely unimportant gave the lowest grades in all categories (solidarity 2.67, democracy 2.86, security 2.70, asylum 3.03). Unlike the other groups, the respondents who find this rather unimportant gave a slightly better grade for security than solidarity (2.20 vs 2.21).

To summarise, the younger and more independent respondents in vocational terms are more critical towards the role Slovenia plays in the EU affairs on normative issues. The less educated generally gave higher grades (the highest grade for solidarity and the lowest for asylum policy was given by those with tertiary education). Those who are more independent in vocational terms gave the lowest grades for solidarity and democracy, and the more marginalised groups gave the lowest grades for security and asylum. Northern regions gave more positive grades, while those affected by the migrant and refugee crisis gave more negative grades for security and asylum. The supporters of nationalist and ultra-conservative parties gave the government the highest grades for solidarity and democracy, while those close to the progressive liberal senior coalition party gave the highest grades for security and asylum. The potential voters of the opposition, anti-reform social liberal and radical progressive parties gave the lowest grades. Furthermore, the supporters of right-wing and social liberal parties gave relatively low grades for security.

There is a positive correlation with support for remaining a member, belief in fair representation and attitudes towards EU politics in the top-down sense. Rather positive views were related to higher grades on security, indicating a link to more positive attitudes towards national politics. Those with moderate attitudes towards the representation system gave the highest and those with very supportive / very critical views the lowest grades for solidarity and democracy / security and asylum, indicating the role of the conservative and radical left opposition. Ethnocentrism and pro-strong authority orientation correlated positively with higher grades.

Part III: General political views and attitudes

Figure 8: Please tell me if you agree or disagree with the following statement: "The European Union often is used as a scapegoat by our politicians to detract from own shortcomings." (%)

Response	%
Totally agree	52
Rather agree	37
Rather disagree	7
Disagree at all	1
Don't know / No answer	3

FDV – CJMMK, Survey on attitudes towards the EU in Slovenia, N=591, 22 November–14 December 2017

As many as 52% of all respondents totally agreed that the EU was used as a scapegoat, with another 37% rather agreeing, while 7% rather disagreed and 1% disagreed completely.

Female respondents agreed with the statement more than men (90% vs 88%). Those under 30 agreed the most (94%), while the 31–45 age group had the highest share of those who disagreed

(14%). Agreement was strongest among the respondents with primary education (97%) and weakest among those with secondary education (10% disagreed). Agreement amongst farmers was strongest (100%), followed by the unemployed (95%) and students (94%). On the other side of the spectrum, as many as 24% of the self-employed disagreed. All of those living in the Zasavje region (100%) agreed, while in Goriška 13% disagreed. A total of 91% of the respondents living in rural areas agreed, while 9% of city and small town dwellers disagreed.

All supporters of the SNS (100%) agreed with the scapegoat view, followed by the supporters of the ZL, SDS (91%) and other parties (93%). On the other side of the spectrum, of as many as 20% of SMC supporters disagreed.

Of those who said Slovenia should leave the EU, 96% agreed (of those who did not know 98% agreed), while as many as 10% of those who said Slovenia should remain disagreed. A higher share (97%) of those who said that the representation of the EU was too positive agreed compared to those who said it was too negative (96%). Of those who said it was fair, 15% disagreed. Of the respondents who disagreed completely with the view that Slovenia is receiving proper treatment, 97% agreed, and of those who definitely agreed on fair treatment 14% disagreed about the EU being used as a scapegoat.

Out of the respondents who fully agree there is a wide gap between ordinary citizens and the elites, 96% agreed. On the other hand, as many as 29% of those who see this view as completely exaggerated disagreed (also 28% of those who see it as rather exaggerated disagreed). Of those who put high importance on cultural homogeneity, 91% agreed, while 12% of those who see it as completely unimportant disagreed. Of those who find it very important to have a strong leader, 94% agreed, while 16% of those perceiving this as rather unimportant disagreed.

To summarise, the respondents agree that the EU is used as a scapegoat by the domestic elites. This view is particularly strong among those under 30, students, pensioners, those living in regions facing development issues and rural areas, as well as among those close to the radical left, opposition and Euro-opportunist parties. It is relatively weaker among those aged 31–45, the self-employed and supporters of the progressive liberal senior coalition party. The view correlates negatively with the preference to remain a member, the perception of a fair representation of the EU and treatment by EU institutions. The view correlates positively with critical views of the representation system, ethnocentrism and pro-strong authority orientation.

Figure 9: Some say there is a wide gap between the views of the citizens and the political elites. Do you think that this description is justified or exaggerated? (%)

FDV – CJMMK, Survey on attitudes towards the EU in Slovenia, N=591, 22 November–14 December 2017

As many as 48% of the respondents believe that the view of a wide gap between the views of ordinary citizens and political elites is totally justified, and a further 38% that it is rather justified, while only 10% say that it is rather exaggerated and 1% that it is totally exaggerated.

The share of respondents who agree that the view is justified is the same across both genders (86%). The belief that the view is justified is strongest among those over 61 (89%), while 13% of those under 30 and those aged 46–60 believe it is exaggerated. Furthermore, it is strongest among those with secondary education (justified: 87%) and weakest among those with only primary education (exaggerated: 13%). It is strongest among farmers and the unemployed (justified: 100% and 94% respectively) and weakest among stay-at-home respondents and the self-employed (exaggerated: 17% and 16% respectively). It is strongest in coast&Kras region (justified: 97%) and weakest in Zasavje and Pomurje (exaggerated: 18%). While 90% of the respondents from bigger cities believe the view is justified, 13% of those from smaller towns believe it is exaggerated.

Turning to political affiliation, 92% of those closest to the SNS believe the view is justified, followed by those close to the DeSUS, ZL and other parties (91%), while as many as 35% SMC supporters, believe the view is exaggerated.

A total of 86% of the respondents who believe Slovenia should leave the EU agrees that the view on the gap between the elites and ordinary citizens is justified to some extent (of those who did not know the answer, 88% believe it is justified), while 12% of those in favour of remaining in the EU believe that the view is exaggerated. Of those who see the portrayal of the EU as too positive, 97% believe the view is justified, while 17% of those who see it as fair believe this view is exaggerated. Of the respondents who disagree completely about Slovenia being treated fairly by EU institutions, 93% believe the view is justified (the same share as with those who did not know the answer), while 26% of those who completely agree about fair treatment believe the gap view is exaggerated.

Out of the respondents who completely agree the EU is being used as a scapegoat, 92% said the view is justified, while as many as 53% of those who disagree totally find it exaggerated. 88% of those who see cultural homogeneity as rather important also see the view about a wide gap as justified, while 15% of those who see cultural homogeneity as rather unimportant find such an approach exaggerated. Of the respondents valuing a strong leader, 88% saw the view as justified, while of those to whom it is not important at all 21% saw it as exaggerated (of those who did not know the answer, 31% saw the view as exaggerated).

To sum up, the view of a wide gap between citizens and the political elites, which is generally considered justified, is particularly strong among older respondents, those with secondary education, the unemployed and those living in less developed regions and in bigger cities (and weakest among younger, stay-at-home and self-employed respondents). The view is strong among supporters of the nationalist, the far-left and the Pensioners' Party, and weak among the supporters of the liberal progressive senior coalition party. The view correlates positively with support for leaving the Union, the perception of a too positive representation of the EU and unfair treatment by EU institutions. The view further correlates positively with the perception of the EU being used as a scapegoat, a rather ethnocentric position (and negatively with a rather non-ethnocentric position) and pro-strong authority orientation.

Figure 10: Please tell me: How important are the following issues for you personally? (%)

FDV – CJMMK, Survey on attitudes towards the EU in Slovenia, N=591, 22 November–14 December 2017

The respondents ranked the categories in the following order: an independent justice (1.14[16]), democracy and human rights (1.18), independent media and civil society (1.24), national unity (1.43) a strong leader (1.63), control of the government by the opposition (1.72) and a culturally homogenous society (1.92).

Female respondents gave higher grades then men in all categories but control of the government by the opposition (democracy 1.12 vs 1.24, homogeneity 1.86 vs 1.98, judiciary 1.12 vs 1.17, strong leader 1.56 vs 1.71, opposition 1.79 vs 1.66, unity 1.44 vs 1.44, media and civil society 1.23 vs 1.24). Male respondents graded opposition control as more important than a strong leader. The 46–60 age group gave the highest grades in all categories (democracy 1.13, homogeneity 1.72, judiciary 1.09, strong leader 1.46, opposition 1.56, unity 1.31, media and civil society 1.21). The oldest population group (over 61) gave the lowest grades for democracy (1.22) and the judiciary (1.14), those aged between 31 and 45 for the judiciary (1.14), and media and civil society (1.29), while young people (under 30) gave the lowest importance to homogeneity (2.22), a strong leader (1.83), opposition control (1.84) and unity (1.59).

Those with only primary school gave the highest grades in all categories except for opposition control (democracy 1.10, homogeneity 1.70, judiciary 1.03, strong leader 1.36, opposition 1.64, unity 1.36, media and civil society 1.16), where those with secondary education (1.63) gave the highest grade. University graduates put the least stress on democracy (1.22), cultural homogeneity (2.10), a strong leader (2.01), opposition control (1.83) and national unity (1.58), while those with vocational education gave the lowest grades for the judiciary, and for media and civil society (1.26 and 1.27 respectively). They put democracy first (1.17) and a strong leader before unity (1.36 vs 1.37). On the other hand, those with university education put media and civil society before democracy (1.21 vs 1.22), and opposition control before a strong leader (1.83 vs 2.01).

Farmers gave the highest grades in all categories (1.00). They were followed by stay-at-home respondents in the democracy category (1.12), a strong leader (1.29) and media and civil society (1.00), and by the unemployed for homogeneity (1.76), opposition control (1.62), national unity (1.35) and the judiciary (1.02). Students put the least importance on democracy (1.30), the self-employed the least on homogeneity (2.27), the judiciary (1.19, the same as pensioners) and unity

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[16] On a scale of 1–4, where 1 means "very important" and 4 means "not important at all".

(1.74), public sector employees on a strong leader (1.92) and media and civil society (1.29), and the private sector on opposition control (1.81).[17]

Regional differences can also be observed. Zasavje gave the highest grades to democracy (1.04), southeast Slovenia to homogeneity (1.67) and unity (1.24), Koroška to the judiciary (1.00), Gorenjska to a strong leader (1.44), Podravje to opposition control (1.53) and the coast&Karst region to media and civil society (1.06). Posavje gave the lowest grade to democracy (1.28) and media and civil society (1.54), central Slovenia to homogeneity (2.11), Gorenjska and Podravje to the judiciary (1.21), the littoral&Notranjska to a strong leader (1.92), Koroška to opposition control (2.49) and the coast&Kras to unity (1.77).[18]

City dwellers were the ones to give the highest priority to democracy (1.16), the judiciary (1.1) and civil society (1.22), the respondents from rural areas to homogeny (1.82), having a strong leader (1.51) and unity (1.36), and those from smaller towns to opposition control (1.68). The rural respondents gave the lowest grades for democracy (1.20), opposition control (1.76) and civil society (1.25), those living in smaller towns for the judiciary (1.20) and civil society (1.25), and those living in bigger cities to homogeneity (2.00), a strong leader (1.84) and unity (1.51). Residents of smaller towns rated democracy slightly more important than the judiciary (1.18 vs 1.20).

The supporters of the SDS gave the highest grades to homogeneity (1.54) and opposition control (1.13), while potential voters of the SNS to a strong leader (1.21) and unity (1.14). SLS supporters give the highest priority to democracy (1.09; followed by the ZL with 1.10 and SDS with 1.11; other parties: 1.07), the GOD to the judiciary (1.00; followed closely by the ZL with 1.01) and the ZL to media and civil society (1.04; other parties: 1.02). ZL supporters put the least importance on homogeneity and having a strong leader (2.15 and 2.04 respectively), those close to the SNS to democracy (1.86), DeSUS to the judiciary (1.36), the PS to opposition control (2.17) and media and civil society (1.58), and the GOD to unity (2.00; ZL: 1.71).[19]

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[17] The private sector ranked democracy higher than the judiciary (1.14 vs 1.15), the self-employed ranked opposition control higher than unity and a strong leader (1.65, 1.74 and 1.91 respectively), stay-at-home respondents value civil society over democracy, the judiciary and a strong leader (1.00, 1.12, 1.16 and 1.29 respectively). Students placed civil society ahead of democracy (1.21 vs 1.30) and opposition control ahead of a strong leader (1.64 vs 1.80).

[18] Pomurje and Podravje rank democracy before the judiciary (1.07 vs 1.12, 1.20 vs 1.21) and opposition control before having a strong leader (1.59 vs 1.63, 1.53 vs 1.54). Koroška places civil society before democracy (1.07 vs 1.1) while ranking opposition control as the least important (2.49). Zasavje ranked democracy ahead of the judiciary (1.04 vs 1.08), while Posavje places unity ahead of civil society (1.43 vs 1.54) and opposition control ahead of a strong leader (1.63 vs 1.68). The littoral&Notranjska places democracy ahead of the judiciary (1.15 vs 1.16) and homogeneity ahead of a strong leader and opposition control (1.86, 1.92 and 2.02 respectively). Central Slovenia places civil society ahead of democracy (1.19 vs 1.20) and opposition control ahead of a strong leader (1.80 vs 1.89), and Gorenjska also puts civil society before democracy (1.23 vs 1.27). The coast&Kras puts civil society first (1.06), followed by democracy (1.12), the judiciary (1.21), opposition control (1.73), a strong leader (1.74) and unity (1.77).

[19] DeSUS supporters ranked democracy before the judiciary (1.35 vs 1.36), unity before media and civil society (1.43 vs 1.48) and homogeneity before opposition control (1.88 vs 1.92). GOD voters placed opposition control second together with democracy and media and civil society (all 1.5), followed by unity, homogeneity and a strong leader (all 2.00). NSi voters value national unity higher than media and civil society (1.26 vs 1.31) and opposition control higher than unity and having a strong leader (1.52, 1.82 and 1.97 respectively). PS voters put unity first (1.49), followed by a strong leader (1.52), democracy (1.56), media and civil society (1.58), homogeneity (1.88) and opposition control (2.17). SD voters value democracy (1.14) higher than an independent judiciary (1.2). SDS voters placed democracy first (1.11), followed closely by the judiciary (1.12), opposition control (1.13), and then national unity (1.23) and media and civil society (1.30). SLS supporters placed democracy first (1.09), followed by unity (1.19), media and civil society (1.22), the judiciary (1.31) and a strong leader (1.36). SMC supporters put media and civil society second (1.16). SNS voters placed media and civil society first (1.07), followed by the judiciary and unity (1.14), a strong leader (1.21), opposition control (1.29), homogeneity (1.84) and democracy (1.86). Those close to ZaAB placed media and civil society (1.19) before democracy (1.24). ZL supporters put media and civil society (1.04) before democracy (1.10) and

Those who believe that the EU is represented in a fair way gave the highest grade to homogeneity (1.91). The belief that the representation of the EU is too positive correlates with putting great importance on a strong leader (1.58), opposition control (1.67), national unity (1.34) and media and civil society (1.22; do not know: 1.15). Those who see the representation as too negative gave the highest grades to democracy (1.1) and the judiciary (1.11). The belief that the representation is too negative correlates with the lowest grade for homogeneity (1.97; do not know: 2.07), a strong leader (1.68), unity (1.51; do not know: 1.52) and civil society (1.29), and such respondents put democracy before the judiciary (1.1 vs 1.11). Those who see the representation as too positive give the least importance to democracy (1.20; do not know: 1.28), and those who see it as fair to the judiciary (1.15; do not know: 1.21) and opposition control (1.72; do not know: 1.88).

The respondents who fully agreed with the view of Slovenia being treated fairly by EU institutions, gave the highest grade to homogeneity (1.66) and having a strong leader (1.53 – same as those who rather disagreed), democracy (1.11), the judiciary (1.09) and opposition control (1.49). Those who completely disagreed about the fair treatment attributed higher value to unity (1.26) and civil society (1.13). On the other hand, the respondents who completely disagreed, gave the lowest grades to homogeneity (1.98), democracy (1.22; do not know: 1.28), opposition control (1.80; do not know: 1.84), those who rather agreed put the least stress on a strong leader (1.7; do not know: 1.81), the judiciary (1.18) and unity (1.49; do not know: 1.50), and those who rather disagreed on civil society (1.28).[20]

The respondents who completely disagreed that the EU was used as a scapegoat gave the highest grades for homogeneity, democracy and an independent judiciary (1.00), those who completely agreed for a strong leader (1.5), opposition control (1.64; do not know: 1.52), unity (1:32) and media and civil society (1.18). Disagreeing with the scapegoat statement is linked to the lowest grade for homogeneity (2.16), democracy (1.27), the judiciary (1.23; do not know: 1.29), unity (1.85), media and civil society (1.44). Those who rather disagreed placed opposition control (1.72) before national unity (1.85), a strong leader (2.02) and homogeneity (2.16). The respondents who completely disagreed placed homogeneity first, together with democracy and the judiciary.

The respondents who assessed the statement of a wide gap between ordinary citizens and the elites as completely exaggerated graded homogeneity with 1.53, a strong leader with 1.52 and the judiciary with 1.00. On the other hand, complete confirmation of the view is associated with a grade of 1.14for democracy, 1.63 for opposition control, 1.31 for unity and 1.19 for media and civil society. Those who believe that the view is rather exaggerated gave the lowest grades for homogeneity and a strong leader (2.04 and 1.73 respectively), while those viewing it as completely exaggerated for democracy (1.53), opposition control (1.87), unity (1.73) and media and civil society (1.56). Those of the opinion that it is rather exaggerated ranked the judiciary at 1.29. The respondents holding this view as completely exaggerated placed having a strong leader (1.52) before homogeneity and democracy (both 1.53), media and civil society (1.56), unity (1.73) and opposition control (1.87).The group which assessed homogeneity as very important gave the highest grades, while those saying it is completely unimportant gave the lowest grades in all categories but media and civil society, where the lowest grade came from those assessing homogeneity as rather unimportant (democracy 1.12 vs 1.35, judiciary 1.06 vs 1.33, opposition 1.52 vs 1.92, unity 1.17 vs 2.34, media and civil society 1.14 vs 1.36). The respondents who viewed it as not important at all placed media and civil society first (1.27) and opposition control before national unity (1.92 vs 2.34). For the respondents who find a strong leader very important, all categories were important (democracy 1.12, judiciary 1.09,

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opposition control (1.95) before a strong leader (2.04). Supporters of parties not included in the survey put media and civil society first (1.02) and opposition control (1.58) before a strong leader (1.79). Unaffiliated respondents put democracy (1.1) before the judiciary (1.21).

[20] Again, those who full agreed about fair treatment placed opposition control before a strong leader (1.49 vs 1.53), just as those who rather agreed (1.71 vs 1.74), who also ranked democracy before the judiciary (1.17 vs 1.18). Those who completely disagreed placed civil society second and opposition control before a strong leader (1.80 vs 1.81).

opposition 1.53, unity 1.20, media and civil society 1.16 – same as those who find a strong leader completely unimportant). On the other hand, those seeing a strong leader as not important at all gave the lowest grades for democracy, the judiciary and unity (1.35, 1.38 and 2.47 respectively). Those of the opinion that homogeneity is rather unimportant ranked the importance of opposition control at 2.12, while those who believe it to be rather important graded media and civil society with 1.36. Those who believe it is rather unimportant placed civil society before democracy (1.19 vs 1.27), and those who find it completely unimportant place civil society first (1.16), democracy second (1.35), followed by the judiciary (1.3), opposition control (1.94) and unity (2.47).

To sum up, female respondents and those aged 46–60 attributed greater importance to normative elements, while the youngest group of respondents attributed the least importance to categories implying ethnocentrism and strong authority, suggesting that their views are more progressive. The oldest respondents put more stress on democracy. Those with primary education give relatively high grades, while those with vocational education attributed relatively low importance to liberal-democratic elements and university graduates to elements implying ethnocentrism and authoritarianism. The less integrated vocational categories attributed relatively high importance to normative elements. The self-employed attribute relatively low importance to homogeneity, students to democracy, public sector employees to a strong leader, as well as media and civil society, and those in the private sector to opposition control. Students and the self-employed place civil society relatively high compared to other elements. Southeastern Slovenia gave the highest grades to homogeneity and unity and Gorenjska to a strong leader. Posavje gave the lowest grade to democracy, media and civil society, while central Slovenia put the least stress on homogeneity and the coast&Kras put the least on unity, indicating a link between relative development and openness and corresponding attitudes. The northwestern regions placed civil society relatively high. Those living in bigger cities attributed greater importance to liberal-democratic elements, and those in rural areas to ethnocentric and pro-strong authority elements.

The voters of the opposition, populist and nationalist parties gave the highest grades to ethnocentric and authoritarian elements, while supporters of conservative parties put the most stress on democracy and the far-left on media and civil society. Conversely, the radical left gave the lowest grades to homogeneity and having a strong leader, and the supporters of the nationalist and the populist liberal-social parties to democracy, media and civil society, as well as opposition control. The voters of conservative parties attributed relatively high importance to national unity, while those close to radical parties put relatively high stress on media and civil society.

The perception of a fair representation of the EU correlates with relative ethnocentrism and a pro-opposition stance, that of a too positive representation with pro-strong authority, pro-national unity and anti-democracy position on the one hand and attribution of importance to media and civil society on the other. A view of a too negative representation correlates with attribution of importance to democracy and an anti-ethnocentric, anti-strong authority and anti-popular position. A strong perception of being treated fairly positively correlates with ethnocentrism, a pro-strong authority and pro-democracy position, while a strong perception of not being treated fairly negatively correlates with attributing importance to ethnocentrism, democracy and opposition control. A strong view of the EU not being used as a scapegoat correlates with strong stress on homogeneity and democracy, while the opposite strong view of the EU as a scapegoat correlates with high grades for a strong leader, national unity and media and civil society. Strong support for the representation system correlates with ethnocentrism, pro-strong authority, anti-democracy and anti-civil society views, and strong criticism is linked to high importance being attributed to democracy, opposition control, unity and civil society. Strong/weak ethnocentrism correlates positively/negatively for all elements but media and civil society. A decisive pro-strong authority view correlates positively with higher grade levels, while a decisive anti-strong authority position correlates with low grades for democracy, the judiciary and unity.

Cross-question analysis

According to the survey, Slovenians are largely in favour of remaining in the EU. Although this is not true for each and every respondent, it applies to all the categories observed. Slovenians see the representation of the EU to be rather fair, although the share of those who see it as too positive was also notable. The view that Slovenia is treated fairly by EU institutions is balanced, with those who are critical slightly prevailing. While the strong support of Slovenians for EU membership is nothing new, the negative views on the treatment by EU institutions could be a result of the more recent events in the relationship between Brussels and Slovenia, especially the pressure the country is facing within the eurozone, as part of the migrant/refugee crisis, the unfavourable decision of the European Commission over the Teran wine dispute[21], as well as relatively weak activity of the Commission in the relation to the implementation of the decision of border arbitration with Croatia[22].

Slovenians believe that EU membership has brought rather more advantages for Slovenia as a business location, for its security, economic welfare and political weight. The view regarding the impact of Slovenia's own politics with respect to the EU is similar but more negative in all categories, with the security placed first. Rather more disadvantages are seen in relation to Slovenia's political weight, which can be explained by relatively scarce communication with the general public about the country's activities in Brussels. Considering normative issues, Slovenians believe that the EU plays a rather positive role for the country's security, mutual understanding and cooperation among EU member states and for the protection of democracy and fundamental rights. A rather negative role is observed in the survey concerning the policy of asylum and refugees, again reflecting a lack of a more decisive common EU policy on this issue. In similar terms, Slovenians believe that the Slovenian government contributes rather positively to solidarity with other EU member states, the country's security and the protection of democracy and human rights, but rather negatively to the policy of asylum and refugees. The respondents gave higher grades to the contribution of the EU, except for the policy of asylum and refugees, and ranked the area of solidarity as the one where the contribution of the Slovenian government was the highest.

The responses regarding policy issues imply that Slovenians are relatively more critical towards the national politics, blaming them for undermining the country's political weight, while giving it more credit in the area of national security as compared to other fields. This could be explained with the high level of political turbulence in the country, especially during the eurozone crisis, which weakened it politically, and with its low level of security risk. The relative criticism of the role of the EU in the asylum policy can be explained with the high pressures endured in the migrant and refugee

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[21] Sometimes small incidences create disappointments among the general public. Slovenia had a dispute over the protection of red wine called Teran, which is protected as a type of wine with a designation of origin, grown only in a geographically very narrow area of Kras. Croatia claimed that its grape variety grown in parts of Istra should also be able to bear the name "Teran". The Commission adopted a delegated act specifying the conditions under which Croatian producers can use the name and how it may appear on wine labels despite Slovenian Teran's Protected Designation of Origin (PDO) if accompanied with the label "Hrvatska Istra" (Croatian Istria). This decision was met with a lot of protest among Slovenian wine producers as well as by the Ministry of Agriculture, and the issue received significant media attention. The impression among the general public was that Slovenia was not treated fairly and that the Commission had betrayed the trust that EU protection of origin was a valid act.

[22] The ruling, issued by a special Arbitration Tribunal on 29 June 2017, was supposed to be implemented by the end of 2017. While Slovenia accepted the ruling, Croatia has refused to recognise its validity, claiming to have withdrawn from the arbitration process (an action not foreseen in the Arbitration Agreement ratified by both states). The EC expressed support for the decision and called upon the two countries to proceed with the implementation, yet no firmer action had been undertaken by the time our survey was conducted. Only in early December did Slovenian news media announce that the First Vice-President of the EC, Frans Timmermans, was going to actively engage on behalf of the Commission as an intermediary between the two states.

crisis due to the failure to find a Community-wide approach. The relatively higher grades for Slovenian politics in the area of solidarity could be considered a result of the general pro-EU stance. Slovenians believe relatively strongly that domestic politicians use the EU as a scapegoat and that there is a wide gap between the views of ordinary citizens and the political elites. As implied by the above results, criticism seems to be primarily oriented towards the domestic politics. Nevertheless, taking into account a notable share of those who see the representation of the EU as too positive and those who find the treatment by EU institutions as unfair, criticism is also directed towards Brussels. Finally, Slovenians consider as very important an independent judiciary, democracy and human rights, independent media and civil society and national unity. Also having a strong leader is perceived as important, as is the control of the government by the opposition and a culturally homogenous society. This shows a very strong liberal-democratic profile of the average voter. Relatively high importance being attributed to the judiciary and a relatively low importance being attributed to opposition control could, on the one hand, be explained by the attention that various never-ending prominent cases in the judiciary have been receiving, and the strong polarisation of the biggest opposition party on the other.

A more detailed analysis of the responses demonstrates that female respondents are generally more critical towards the EU and government politics, e.g. specifically in the areas of business and economy, and attribute higher importance to normative issues. Younger respondents are more convinced that Slovenia is treated fairly by EU institutions, but are more critical towards government politics, seeing disadvantages in all areas, especially in business and economy. They are less convinced of advantages in the area of security and are more likely to believe that domestic politics are using the EU as a scapegoat. This could be a sign of an intergenerational conflict. They demonstrate relatively strong trust in the representation system and are the least ethnocentric and pro-strong authority oriented. The oldest respondents, on the other hand, demonstrate a strong appreciation for the contribution of the EU and government politics to security, are critical towards the representation system and attribute relatively less importance to democracy.

Pro-European attitudes in general correlate with education levels and more open and better-integrated vocational categories that benefit more from economic development. The better educated are relatively critical towards the EU and government politics in areas of security and asylum, as well as towards the representation system, and tend to attribute relatively high importance to normative elements. The better integrated vocational categories were meanwhile relatively critical towards government politics with regard to solidarity and democracy. Interestingly, the respondents with only primary education tend to give very high grades to the EU and especially government politics, while those with secondary education gave the lowest grades and were relatively critical towards the representation system. This could be explained with a certain level of conformism of the former or with diverging economic effects on these two categories. The respondents with vocational education attributed relatively little importance to liberal-democratic norms, while those with tertiary education gave little importance to ethnocentrism and strong authority.

The more developed, open and integrated regions and areas with higher density of population are more pro-EU oriented and attribute greater importance to the civil society. The lowest grades in the areas of security and asylum were given in the regions affected by the migrant and refugee crisis. The respondents living in cities are more critical towards the representation system, and attribute greater importance to liberal-democratic norms, while those living in rural areas attribute greater importance to ethnocentrism and strong authority.

From the perspective of party politics, pro-EU attitudes are stronger among supporters of progressive, conservative, liberal, coalition and traditional parties, and weaker among supporters of anti-reform and populist social liberal or nationalist parties (see introduction for details). As might be expected, the voters of conservative, anti-reform social liberal and right-wing parties are more critical towards the EU and government politics in the area of security. The voters of conservative parties tend to see the representation of the EU as too negative, while the voters of the radical left, populist and nationalist parties see it as too positive and are also critical towards the representation

system. Putting great importance on ethnocentrism and strong authority (and less importance on liberal and democratic norms) is typical of populist and nationalist parties, while conservative ones find democracy and national unity important. The radical left attributes highest importance to the media and civil society (and less importance to ethnicity and authority).

Pro-EU attitudes correlate with the perception of a fair representation of the EU and positive attitudes towards EU politics in the top-down and bottom-up sense. The perception of a fair representation correlates with moderate attitudes towards EU politics in the top-down and bottom-up sense. Those who see the representation as too positive are also critical of the impact of Slovenian politics on the country's political weight and economic welfare. The respondents who perceive the impact on security more negatively tend to see the EU being used as a scapegoat more often, while those who think the impact is more positive give higher grades to government policies on normative issues.

Pro-EU attitudes correlate with trust in the representation system, rather non-ethnocentric and anti-strong authority views, while scepticism is strongest among those who are very critical towards the representation system and very non-ethnocentric and pro-strong authority oriented. The respondents with rather ethnocentric and pro-strong authority views are less critical towards representation and give higher grades to government policy and EU policy on normative issues, while those with anti-authority views give lower grades on these issues, indicating a split between nationalists and progressives. Those with radical progressive positions are critical of the impact on economic welfare and business. The pro-strong authority oriented respondents, on the other hand, are critical towards the impact on political weight and security.

Conclusion

The purpose of the survey was to establish the scope and drivers of anti-European and populist sentiments in Slovenia. The analysis of the survey largely confirms the strong pro-European orientation of Slovenians. Nevertheless, there are certain categories of respondents that are relatively more Eurosceptic, such as those who are less educated and skilled, those living in less developed regions and rural areas. This signals the importance of more inclusive and balanced economic policies. The national government is still the one to take a large part of the blame for more critical views on the EU, which is specifically visible in the responses of the younger generation and those who are self-dependent in vocational terms. Especially the latter are quite critical towards government policies. In part, this could indicate inter-generation tensions and a view that structural reforms are not moving fast enough. Interestingly, some of the before mentioned categories, where the feeling is that they were somehow left behind, are also quite critical towards the impact of the EU and national politics on security.

From the perspective of party politics, progressive, conservative and liberal parties seem to be favoured by voters with pro-European positions. On the other hand, a mixture of very different types of political options (populist and nationalist parties, newly emerged social liberal parties, ultra-conservative parties) as well as representatives of a more anti-reform or Euro-opportunist turn in some of the established parties seem to catch the sympathies of those disappointed with the developments since Slovenia became a member of the EU. The positions of traditional parties are much more pro-European, with the senior coalition party being a notable exception. This is a sign of how the crisis of European policies infects the traditional representation system and party politics. Those close to the radical left are critical towards the EU and government policies in different areas, towards representation and democracy, but are in principle not anti-European. Party preferences of pro-European voters demonstrate that the EU project has, in the search for the centre, somehow moved towards the right, creating an empty space in the centre-left.

The analysis of general normative positions demonstrated that although support for the EU is the strongest among those with rather non-ethnocentric and anti-strong authority positions, it is those

with more ethnocentric views and those who value strong authority who tend to be more supportive towards the EU and, specifically, national policies in the area of EU affaires when it comes to specific issues. On the other hand, the younger, better educated and better placed respondents, who have more progressive views in terms of importance of democracy and human rights, independent media and civil society and opposition control of the government, are in principle pro-European, but are also relatively critical towards the EU and government policies. This shows that the move towards the centre-right and security aimed at saving the European project comes at a cost of losing the support of the progressive base and, perhaps, in the long term, could lead to a different sort of Europe, one that will be more nationalistic, based on a clearer division of authorities and possibly with less attention on solidarity among EU members.

Appendix 1: Questionnaire

PART 1 – GENERAL ATTITUDES TOWARDS THE EU

1) **A general question to begin with: Should [OUR COUNTRY] remain a member of the European Union or leave the European Union?**

Our country should remain a member of the European Union	1
Our country should leave the European Union	2
Don't know / No answer	3

2) **Do you think that the European Union is depicted in a fair way, too positive or too negative in the political discussion in our country?**

In a fair way	1
Too positive	2
Too negative	3
Don't know / No answer	4

3) **Do you think that our country overall is treated in a fair way by the institutions of the European Union?**

I definitely agree	1
I rather agree	2
I rather not agree	3
I definitely not agree	4
Don't know / No answer	5

4) **Do you think that <u>EU-membership</u> currently brings more advantages or more disadvantages for…**

	Definitely more advantages	Rather more advantages	Rather more disadvantages	Definitely more disadvantages	Don't know / No answer

Our country as a business location	1	2	3	4	5
The economic welfare of our country	1	2	3	4	5
The political weight of our country	1	2	3	4	5
The security of our country	1	2	3	4	5

5) **Do you think that <u>the politics of our country</u> regarding European matters currently bring more advantages or more disadvantages for…**

	Definitely more advantages	Rather more advantages	Rather more disadvantages	Definitely more disadvantages	Don't know / No answer
…our country as a business location	1	2	3	4	5
…the economic welfare of our country	1	2	3	4	5
…the political weight of our country	1	2	3	4	5
…the security of our country	1	2	3	4	5

PART II – EU-RELATED POLICY CHALLENGES

6) **Do you think <u>the European Union</u> is playing a positive or negative role in the following areas?**

	A very positive role	A rather positive role	A rather negative role	A very negative role	Don't know / No answer
Concerning mutual understanding and cooperation between the EU member states	1	2	3	4	5
Concerning the protection of democracy and fundamental rights	1	2	3	4	5
Concerning the security of our country	1	2	3	4	5
Concerning the policy of asylum and refugees	1	2	3	4	5

7) **Do you think <u>our country</u> is playing a positive or negative role in the European Union in the following areas:**

	A very positive role	A rather positive role	A rather negative role	A very negative role	Don't know / No answer
Concerning solidarity with other EU member states	1	2	3	4	5
Concerning the protection of democracy and fundamental rights	1	2	3	4	5
Concerning the security of our country	1	2	3	4	5

Concerning the policy of asylum and refugees	1	2	3	4	5

8) **Please tell me if you agree or disagree with the following statement:** *"The European Union often is used as a scapegoat by our politicians to detract from own short-comings."*

Yes, totally agree	1
Yes, rather agree	2
No, rather disagree	3
No, disagree at all	4
Don't know / No answer	5

PART III – ATTITUDES TOWARDS DEMOCRACY AND FUNDAMENTAL FREEDOMS

9) **Some say that there is a wide gap between the views of the citizens and the political elites. Do you think that this description is justified or exaggerated?**

It is totally justified	1
It is rather justified	2
It is rather exaggerated	3
It is totally exaggerated	4
Don't know / No answer	5

10) **Please tell me: How important are the following issues for you personally?**

	Very important	Rather important	Rather not important	Not important at all	Don't know / No answer
Democracy and human rights	1	2	3	4	5
A culturally homogenous society	1	2	3	4	5
An independent justice	1	2	3	4	5
A strong leader	1	2	3	4	5
Control of the government by the opposition	1	2	3	4	5
National unity	1	2	3	4	5
Independent media and civil society	1	2	3	4	5

Demography:

Weighting by GENDER, AGE AND EDUCATION

A) **Gender:**   Male

                Female

B) **Age:**   18 – 25 (*Attention:* minimum age: 18 years!)

                26 – 35

                36 – 50

                51 – 65

                66 +

C) **(Highest grade of) Education:**
a) University
b) Upper secondary level ("Mittelschule")

c) Lower secondary level ("Berufs- oder Handelsschule")
d) Primary level ("Pflichtschule ohne weitere Ausbildung – Volksschule, Hauptschule)

D) Employment:

Are you currently…? In training (student, scholar)
Retired
House person
Out of work
Self-employed
Farmer
Private sector
Civil servant

E) **Province:**   federal counties/provencies/regions
(country specific categories – in Austria "Bundesländer")

F) **City size:**   Rural village

Small/Mid size town

Large town

(categories respond Flash Eurobarometer 452 on regional policy)

Party preference: *country-specific categories*